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ABSTRACT
Pseudorandom generator schemes containing irregu-
larly clocked linear feedback shift-registers (LFSRs)
have become popular because of the properties of
their output sequences (long period and large linear
complexity). In this paper, a cryptanalytic attack
on such schemes that utilizes the divide-and-conquer
paradigm is presented. The general statistical model
of such generators is given. The appropriate family
of edit-distance measures is dened and the ow of
an attack on some particular schemes is described.
The time and space complexities of the attack are
discussed.
Keywords: Cryptanalysis, Edit-distance, Clock-
controlled sequence, Ciphertext-only attack, Statis-
tical model.
1. INTRODUCTION
Pseudorandom sequence generators are often used in
practical data protection systems because of ease of
their implementation, low-cost key distribution and
good practical secrecy. In order for such generators
to be used in data protection systems, their output
sequences must satisfy some predened criteria, the
most important of which are long period, large linear
complexity and good statistical properties. The gen-
erators that include irregularly clocked linear feed-
back shift registers (LFSRs) as building blocks satisfy
those criteria easily. In this paper, a cryptanalytic
attack on this family of generators is presented.
The general pseudorandom generator scheme that
is investigated here consists of n binary LFSRs of
lengths l
1
; l
2
; : : : ; l
n
, whose outputs are combined in
a function F = (f; g) with L bits of memory, where
f : f0; 1g
L+n
 ! f0; 1g is the output function and
g : f0; 1g
L+n
 ! f0; 1g
L
is the next-state function
of F. Each LFSR is irregularly clocked by a distinct
subgenerator.
A statistical model of this scheme is presented in the
Fig. 1. The n input sequences, X
1
; X
2
; : : : ; X
n
of
lengths N
1
; N
2
; : : : ; N
n
, respectively are transformed
into the sequence Y of length M by means of their
corresponding decimation sequences d
i
; i = 1; : : : ; n,
the function F and the noise sequence Z in which
the probability of one is P (z
i
= 1) = p < 0:5;
i = 1; : : : ;M .
Fig. 1 - The statistical model of the generator containing irregularly clocked LFSRs
The function F can generally be decomposed into two
parts [2]:
1. a balanced part F (f; g), where f : f0; 1g
L+K
 !
f0; 1g, and g : f0; 1g
L+K
 ! f0; 1g
L
, f being
balanced;
2. a non-balanced (so called noisy) part F
0
(f
0
; g
0
),
where f
0
: f0; 1g
L
0
+n K
 ! f0; 1g, and
g
0
: f0; 1g
L
0
+n K
 ! f0; 1g
L
0
, f
0
being non-
balanced;
where L = L+ L
0
.
The set of sequences fX
1
; X
2
; : : : ; X
n
g is related
to the sequence Y through its ordered sub-
sets fX
j
1
; X
j
2
; : : : ; X
j
K
g, generated by the LFSRs
R
j
1
;R
j
2
; : : : ;R
j
K
, respectively, j
i
2 f1; : : : ; ng. The
particular subset depends on the partition of F.
Given one of such ordered subsets, the correspond-
ing constrained edit-distance measure is dened as
the minimum number of elementary edit-operations
(deletions and substitutions) needed to transform
this subset into the sequence Y . The maximum
length E
i
of a run of deletions in the sequence X
j
i
represents the constraint, i = 1; : : : ;K.
2. CONSTRAINED EDIT-DISTANCES
Let [a
1
]; : : : ; [a
K
] and [b] beK+1 sequences of lengths
N
1
; : : : ; N
K
and M (M  minfN
1
; : : : ; N
K
g), re-
spectively, over the alphabet f0; 1g. Let f :
f0; 1g
L+K
! f0; 1g be the output function and let
g : f0; 1g
L+K
! f0; 1g
L
be the next-state function of
the function with memory F = (f; g). Let S be any
state of the memory of the function F .
Consider the problem of transforming the ordered set
([a
1
]; : : : ; [a
K
]) into [b] by using deletions of symbols
in [a
1
]; : : : ; [a
K
] respectively reducing them to the se-
quences [a
0
1
]; : : : ; [a
0
K
] of the same lengthM , and then
substitutions for symbols in the sequence [c] obtained
from [a
0
1
]; : : : ; [a
0
K
] by the function F = (f; g), that
is, at the time instant t:
S
t+1
= g(S
t
; a
0
1t
; : : : ; a
0
Kt
); 1  t M   1 (1)
c
t
= f(S
t
; a
0
1t
; : : : ; a
0
Kt
); 1  t M; (2)
starting from a given initial state S
1
.
Constrained edit-distance (CED) D
F
between the or-
dered set ([a
1
], : : : ; [a
K
]) and [b] is then dened as
the minimum sum of elementary edit-distances asso-
ciated with the edit-operations of deletion and sub-
stitution needed to transform ([a
1
]; : : : ; [a
K
]) to [b]
subject to the constraint that the maximum number
of consecutive deletions in the sequence [a
i
] is E
i
,
1  i  K. It follows that
M  N
i
M +E
i
(M + 1); 1  i  K: (3)
Nonnegative real-valued elementary distances are de-
ned by:
1. d(x; ) is the elementary distance associated with
deletion of x 2 f0; 1g from the sequence [a
i
],
1  i  K, where the 'empty' symbol  is in-
troduced to represent deletion;
2. d(x; y) is the elementary distance associated with
substitution of x by y, x; y 2 f0; 1g.
In order to dene the explicit expression for the
constrained edit-distance, we represent an edit-
transformation sequentially. Namely, we de-
ne a (K + 1)-dimensional edit-sequence E =
([
1
]; : : : ; [
K
]; []) over the alphabet f0; 1; g of
length L = M(1   K) +
P
K
i=1
N
i
by the following
encoding scheme. First, let for an arbitrary nite
length sequence [a] over f0; 1g, [] denote any nite
length sequence over f0; 1; g such that by remov-
ing all the 'empty' symbols from [] one obtains [a].
Then, an edit-sequence ([
1
]; : : : ; [
K
]; []) is dened
by the following rules:
1. The lengths of [
1
]; : : : ; [
K
] and [] are all equal
to L = M(1  K) +
P
K
i=1
N
i
, which is the total
number of deletions and substitutions.
2. If 
1
(i); : : : ; 
K
(i) and (i) are all non-empty
symbols, then the substitution of the correspond-
ing symbol in the combination sequence [c] by the
symbol (i) takes place, for any 1  i  L.
3. If (i) and K   1 symbols of 
1
(i); : : : ; 
K
(i) are
all 'empty' symbols and one of 
1
(i); : : : ; 
K
(i) is
not the 'empty' symbol, then the deletion of that
symbol takes place, for any 1  i  L.
4. For any 1  i  L no other cases apart from 2.
and 3. are allowed.
5. In any sequence of consecutive deletions, one rst
deletes symbols from [a
1
], then from [a
2
], and so
on.
6. The maximum number of consecutive deletions in
[a
i
] is E
i
; 1  i  K.
The rule 5. ensures the unique sequential represen-
tation of edit-transformations, meaning that there is
an one-to-one correspondence between the set of all
the permitted edit-sequences ([
1
]; : : : ; [
K
], []) de-
ned as above, denoted by ,([a
1
]; : : : ; [a
K
]; [b]), and
the set of all the permitted edit-transformations of
([a
1
]; : : : ; [a
K
]) into [b].
For each edit-sequence E one can compute the mem-
ory state sequence [S(i)]
M
i=1
using the recursion (1),
and then form the extended state sequence [(i)]
L
i=1
over f0; 1; g inserting the 'empty' symbol wherever
there is the 'empty' symbol in E .
The constrained edit-distance can be expressed in
terms of edit-sequences and extended state sequences
by:
D
F
([a
1
]; : : : ; [a
K
]; [b]) =
= min
(
L
X
i=1
d
F
((i); 
1
(i); : : : ; 
K
(i);(i)) j
([
1
]; : : : ; [
K
]; []) 2 ,([a
1
]; : : : ; [a
K
]; [b])
)
(4)
where
d
F
((i); 
1
(i); : : : ; 
K
(i);(i)) =
=

d(
j
(i); ); j 2 f1; : : : ;Kg;
d(f((i); 
1
(i); : : : ; 
K
(i)); (i)); (i) 6= :
(5)
Example: Let K = 3, g(S; x
1
; x
2
; x
3
) = S + x
1
+
x
2
+ x
3
, f = g, S
1
= 0, E
i
= 1, 1  i  3,
[a
1
] = 10110110001, [a
2
] = 01011110, [a
3
] =
101100010110, and [b] = 101110. The edit-sequence
and the extended state sequence for a permitted edit-
transformation are given by
E =
2
6
6
4
1  0   1 1  0 1  1   0 0  0 1
  0 1  0   1   1 1  1   0 
 1 0  1 1  0 0  0 1  0 1  1 0 
  1   0   1   1   1   0 
3
7
7
5
,
[
i
] = [
  0   0   1   0   0   0 
].
Assuming that the elementary distances associated
with deletions and eective substitutions are all equal
to one, by using (4), one can determine that the dis-
tance corresponding to this edit-sequence is 17.
En ecient algorithm for calculating the value of the
distance measure dened in (4) can be found in [2].
3. DESCRIPTION OF THE ATTACK
Given the output sequence Y , the attack tries to re-
construct the initial states of the LFSRs that pro-
duce the subset fX
j
1
; X
j
2
; : : : ; X
j
K
g, j
i
2 f1; : : : ; ng
of the set of sequences fX
1
; X
2
; : : : ; X
n
g, according
to the actual partition of the function F. Given such
subset, the procedure determines the candidate ini-
tial states that could generate it. For every candi-
date initial state, all the corresponding decimation
sequences can be determined by means of the back-
tracking procedure that reconstructs all the optimal
(i.e. of minimum total weight) edit-transformations.
These decimation sequences can then be used for the
ciphertext-only attacks on the corresponding deci-
mating subgenerators. In such a way, the original
problem is reduced to a set of lower-dimension prob-
lems.
The attack introduced above is essentially a decision-
making procedure. The algorithm accepts one of
the two hypotheses, for all the possible initial states
f
^
X
j
1
;
^
X
j
2
; : : : ;
^
X
j
K
g, j
i
2 f1; : : : ; ng of the corre-
sponding LFSRs where
^
X
j
i
is the initial state of the
LFSR that produces the sequence X
j
i
. These hy-
potheses are:
H
0
- the observed sequence Y is produced by the ini-
tial states f
^
X
j
1
;
^
X
j
2
; : : : ;
^
X
j
K
g ;
H
1
- the observed sequence Y is not produced by the
initial states f
^
X
j
1
;
^
X
j
2
; : : : ;
^
X
j
K
g.
The decision-making procedure includes the decision
threshold T . The value of this threshold can be cal-
culated from the probabilities of 'missing the event'
P
m
and 'false alarm' P
f
. Setting these parameters
correctly ensures relatively small number of candi-
dates for the initial states of the investigated LFSRs
that could produce the observed output sequence, as
well as the high probability that the true solution is
in this set of candidates.
The attack proceeds along the following lines:
1. Determine the probability of 'false alarm' P
f
and
the probability of 'missing the event' P
m
, as well
as the decision threshold T directly generalizing
the method described in [1].
2. Determine the set of solution candidates in the
following way: for all the possible states of all
the LFSRs R
j
1
;R
j
2
; : : : ;R
j
K
, generate the corre-
sponding output sequences of length N and calcu-
late the constrained edit-distance between this set
of sequences and the observed output sequence. If
this distance is less than the threshold T , put the
current initial states of R
j
1
;R
j
2
; : : : ;R
j
K
, into the
set of solution candidates.
3. For every member of the solution candidates
set, reconstruct all the optimal edit-sequences
by means of the backtracking procedure. From
these edit-sequences, extract the correspond-
ing irregular clocking sequences of the LFSRs
R
j
1
;R
j
2
; : : : ;R
j
K
.
4. Use the extracted irregular clocking sequences
to reconstruct the corresponding initial states
of the subgenerators that clock the LFSRs
R
j
1
;R
j
2
; : : : ;R
j
K
by means of a ciphertext-only
attack adapted to each of the subgenerators.
5. Check whether the obtained solution can gen-
erate more than M output bits correctly. The
correctness of the solution can be checked mea-
suring the Hamming distance between the gener-
ated sequence and the observed sequence. If it
is less than the predetermined threshold Q
0
, ac-
cept the solution. Otherwise, choose the next op-
timal edit-sequence reconstructed in the step 3.
If none of these edit-sequences produces the satis-
factory output sequence, then choose another so-
lution candidate determined in the step 2.
4. THE ATTACK ON SOME
PARTICULAR SCHEMES
4.1 Consider rst the simplest case without the func-
tion F, where the generator is made up of the LFSR
R
1
clocked irregularly by the subgenerator consisting
only of another LFSR R
SG
(Fig. 2).
Fig. 2 - The simplest scheme containing two LFSRs
Then, the attack described in the Section 3 has the
following particular form:
1. Proceed along the same lines as described in the
Section 3, Item 1.
2. Determine the set of solution candidates in the fol-
lowing way: for every possible state of the LFSR
R
1
, generate the corresponding output sequence
of length N and calculate the constrained edit-
distance between this sequence and the observed
output sequence. The algorithm for calculating
the edit-distance for this particular case is given
in [1]. The implementation of this algorithm can
be carried out in linear space, using only two vec-
tors that correspond to the current and previous
substitutions [1]. In order to reconstruct one op-
timal edit-sequence in linear space, any of the al-
gorithms for reconstructing the longest common
subsequence (see, for example, [3]) adapted ap-
propriately can be used.
If the distance calculated by this algorithm is less
than the threshold T , put the current initial state
of R
1
into the set of solution candidates.
3. For every member of the solution candidates
set, reconstruct all the optimal edit-sequences by
means of any classical search method (depth-rst
or breadth-rst). The depth-rst search method
consumes less memory but is slower. The memory
that consumes the breadth-rst search method de-
pends on the number of optimal edit-sequences to
be reconstructed, which is generally large. This
makes the breadth-rst search method inconve-
nient for processing long sequences. The depth-
rst search method can be implemented using ei-
ther of the following backtracking procedures:
Algorithm a: This algorithm uses the matrix of
partial constrained edit-distances [1]. This ma-
trix is swept from the right-most column to the
left-most column updating the stack of branching
points. Upon arrival to the left-most column, the
algorithm backtracks to the last branching point,
selecting the new direction and updating the stack
appropriately.
The total number of possible optimal paths in
the matrix depends on the sequences and cannot
be calculated precisely. In [5] the expression for
the total number of edit-sequences without con-
straints is given. Let n
p
be the total number of
paths in the matrix of partial constrained edit-
distances. Then the expression given in [5] can be
rened easily if E
1
= 1. Therefore the following
expression gives the total number of paths in the
matrix (optimal and suboptimal) in that case:
n
p
=
1
X
i=0

M
N  M   i

(6)
Hence, the worst-case time complexity of the Al-
gorithm a) is proportional to Mn
p
. The space
complexity of this algorithm is proportional to
M(N  M).
Algorithm b: This algorithm uses the vec-
tors needed for calculating the constrained edit-
distance in linear space (see item 2). For every
step of the algorithm a), the algorithm given in
[3] is run once, up to the point equivalent to the
right-most column of the corresponding matrix
above, then to the point equivalent to the right-
most column-1,: : :, updating the stack of branch-
ing points. Upon execution of the algorithm given
in [3] up to the point equivalent to the left-most
column of the corresponding matrix, the back-
tracking is performed to the last branching point,
selecting the new direction and updating the stack
appropriately. The total number of possible paths
(optimal and suboptimal) to be traversed in the
worst case is given by (6). As for the number
of possible optimal paths, the same discussion is
valid as that given in the description of the Al-
gorithm a). Thus, the time complexity of the
Algorithm b) is proportional to M(N   M)n
p
.
However, the space complexity of this algorithm
is proportional to N  M .
Keeping in mind the time and space complexities
of the algorithms a) and b), it can be said that
the Algorithm b) should be used only when the
sequences are too long to maintain in memory the
matrix of partial constrained edit-distances.
From the reconstructed optimal edit-sequences,
extract the corresponding irregular clocking se-
quences of the LFSR R
SG
.
4. Use the extracted irregular clocking sequences to
reconstruct the corresponding initial states of R
SG
by means of the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm [4].
5. Check whether the obtained solution can gen-
erate more than M output bits correctly. The
correctness of the solution can be checked mea-
suring the Hamming distance between the gener-
ated sequence and the observed sequence. If it
is less than the predetermined threshold Q
0
, ac-
cept the solution. Otherwise, choose the next op-
timal edit-sequence reconstructed in the step 3.
If none of these edit-sequences produces the satis-
factory output sequence, then choose another so-
lution candidate determined in the step 2.
4.2 Consider now the scheme that contains several
blocks. Each of them consists of two LFSRs R
1
and R
2
irregularly clocked by distinct subgenerators
based only on single LFSRs R
1SG
, R
2SG
, whose out-
puts are combined in the JK ip-op (Fig. 3).
In this case, for every given block f
j
= x
j
1

g
j

1 x
j
1
 x
j
2

, g
j+1
= f
j
, g
1
= 0, K = 2, L = 1.
The blocks are combined in a balanced non-linear
function without memory. The procedure presented
above can also be implemented here with the appro-
priate constrained edit-distance function that corre-
sponds to the transformation of a pair of sequences
into an observed sequence via the JK ip-op. In
such a way, the complexity of the cryptanalytic prob-
lem would be reduced to the complexity of the re-
construction of the initial states of the pairs of the
LFSRs that serve as inputs to the distinct JK ip-
ops. But the time complexity of the algorithm for
calculating the constrained edit-distance is now pro-
portional to M(N
1
 M)(N
2
 M), where N
1
and N
2
are the respective lengths of the output sequences of
the LFSRs R
1
and R
2
without irregular clocking and
M is the length of the observed output sequence. The
space complexity of this algorithm is proportional to
(N
1
 M)(N
2
 M).
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, an attack on some particular pseu-
dorandom sequence generators containing irregularly
clocked LFSRs is described. For every such genera-
tor, the time and space complexities of the particu-
lar implementation of the general attack have been
analysed. Other similar and even more complicated
schemes can be cryptanalysed by this method in rea-
sonable time and space.
Fig. 3 - The generator containing JK ip-ops
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